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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Foster Home Policy Upheld
The New York Court of Appeals re-
cently sustained the Jewish Child Care
Association's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus compelling appellants, foster par-
ents, to return a child whom the agency had
left in their care. The custody of the child
had been given to the appellants upon the
express understanding that the child would
eventually be returned to its natural parent.
The petition was necessitated by the refusal
of the appellants to return the child, who
had been with them for 41 years, and their
attempt at adoption, which is contrary to
the known policies of Child Care. The writ
was sustained on the basis of a natural
mother's primary love and custodial interest
in the care and welfare of the child.'
Habeas corpus proceedings involving the
custody of a child are governed by equity
and, above all, by the welfare of the child.2
Included, however, in this concept of the
child's welfare, is a presumption that a
child should be in the custody of his natural
parents. It is conceivable, nevertheless,
that in cases involving parents and non-
I In the Matter of Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.
2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
2 See Vzga v. Dunn, 200 Misc. 732, 104 N.Y.S.2d
93 (Sup. Ct. 1951); People ex rel. Riesner v. New
York Nursery and Child's Hosp., 230 N.Y. 119,
124, 129 N.E. 341, 343 (1920).
3 People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue Child
Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 337, 85 N.Y.S.
2d 541, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See 1 SCHOULER,
MARRIAGE, DivORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 744, at 798 (6th ed. 1921).
parents, the welfare of the child may come
in conflict with this common-law presump-
tion. Where the natural parents are "unfit"
there seems to be no problem in decreeing
for the non-parents.4 Where this is not the
case an examination of the several elements
of "the child's welfare" is difficult. The de-
termination is further complicated by the
fact that the right of the natural parent to
raise his child is a fundamental and pre-
dominant one5 - so fundamental that the
United States Supreme Court has stated that
the right to establish a home and rear chil-
dren is included in the guarantee afforded
by the Fourteenth Amendment., The courts
in these cases act as parens patriae7 and ex-
amine the special facts of each case.8 The
character of the natural parents, 9 their abil-
ity to care for the child, the child's sex, age,
religion, and wishes are all considered.' 0
For a child to be adopted, it is imperative
that it be determined whether the consent
of the natural parents is necessary, inasmuch
4 See, e.g., In the Matter of Vanderbilt, 245 App.
Div. 211, 281 N.Y. Supp. 171 (1st Dep't 1935);
Vzga v. Dunn, supra note 2; Reimann v. Reimann,
39 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
5 People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 -N.Y. 465,
468, 113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953); see Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (dictum).
6 Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 5.
7 People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, supra note 5.
8 Watson v. Watson, 134 S.C. 147, 132 S.E. 39
(1926).
9Vzga v. Dunn, 200 Misc. 732, 104 N.Y.S.2d 93
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
10 See Israel v. Israel, 38 Misc. 335, 77 N.Y. Supp.
912 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
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as adoption takes away legally-recognized
parental rights.1 1 Once having given con-
sent, what right does a natural parent have
to withdraw it? This problem has particu-
larly perplexed New York courts. 12 While
no general rule has been formulated to
govern such cases,' 3 the courts will some-
times give effect to the parents' "change of
heart" and allow the child to return to the
natural parents. This is especially true if
the final adoption order has not been de-
creed. 14 It has been suggested that this right
of revocation be made conditional upon its
being in the best interest of the child. 5
A source of disturbance in this area is
found in the cases involving extended care
by foster parents of a child placed by a
welfare and child care agency 16 such as the
petitioner in the present case. When a child
has been surrendered for adoption and has
become acclimated to a new environment,
the natural parents' desire to recover him
has been met with deserved dismissal. 17
However, when the foster parents know at
the outset that the child will not be with
them permanently and the child neverthe-
less becomes thoroughly integrated as a
part of the foster home, the determination
as to future custody becomes a weighty
11 See Note, 30 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 75 (1955).
12 Id. at 77.
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 77-78.
15 Id. at 82. This "best interest of the child" doc-
trine is presently the criterion used in determining
custody cases.
16 See, e.g., Convent of the Sisters of Mercy v.
Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
1950); People ex rel. Our Lady of Victory Infant
Home v. Venniro, 126 Misc. 135, 21-2 N.Y. Supp.
741 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
17 See People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner of
Welfare, 188 Misc. 919, 70 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
one indeed. One New York court granted
custody to the agency, pending release to the
natural parents, stating that where both
parties are proper guardians, the one with
the "superior right"'18 would be awarded
custody. Another determination rejected
this "superior right" doctrine, and stated
that the welfare of the child was the para-
mount consideration and, on that basis,
awarded custody to the foster parents. 19
While it is true that the primary concern
in such cases must be the child's welfare,
there is an important policy consideration
involved.20 The New York Social Welfare
Law empowers an authorized agency to
place and board out children whose par-
ents are not able to care for them. 21 The
law grants the agency discretion to deter-
mine whether a child should be removed
from the home in which it was placed. 22
This grant, however, is limited by a court
of equity's discretion to arrange for custody
if the facts of the case necessitate it.23 The
legislature's intent in granting such powers
to private agencies would seem to be that in
view of conditions presently existing in
New York City, the efforts of the Depart-
ment of Welfare to find enough responsible
foster families are well supplemented by
voluntary agencies such as the petitioner. 24
Concurring in this appraisal, the Greater
Is People ex rel. Our Lady of Victory Infant Home
v. Venniro, supra note 16, at 139, 212 N.Y. Supp.
at 745.
19 Mary I-- v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, 200
Misc. 115, 104 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
20 See Convent of the Sisters of Mercy v. Barbieri,
supra note 16.
21 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 374(1).
22 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 383(2).
23 Mary I--- v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, supra
note 19, at 121-22, 104 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
24 See People v. Whitted, 124 N.Y.S.2d 189, 193
(Mag. Ct. 1953).
New York Fund made a special grant to
several private agencies to help them in-
crease their facilities for these children.25
When a child is placed by an agency in a
foster home, the foster parents are care-
fully appraised of the function of the
agency, as well as their own responsibility
of preparing the child for its eventual return
to its family.26 During this period the
agency's personnel assist the natural par-
ents in preparing for the return of their
child. 27 The agency pays the foster parents
an agreed sum of money for the child's
room and board, as well as for clothes
and medical care. 28 Persons accepting such
children are expressly told that adoption is
not permitted. 29 In order to maintain ties
between the child and its natural parents,
the program contemplates periodic visits
by the natural parents with the child at the
foster home.5 0
In deciding a case such as this, the court
must weigh the initial bewilderment and
fear a child experiences in being removed
from the only home he has ever consciously
known, against the blow to the welfare of
thousands of children who have been aided
or will be aided, through foster homes ad-
ministered by child care agencies. 3 1 Had a
contrary decision been rendered, it is con-
ceivable that parents who desperately
needed this help would not seek it for fear
25 Ibid.
26 In the Matter of Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5
N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1959).
27 Id. at 225, 156 N.E.2d at 701, 183 N.Y.S.2d at
66.




31 See Convent of the Sisters of Mercy v. Barbieri,
200 Misc. 112, 113, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2, 4 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
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of losing their child. In such a situation, the
child would be the one to suffer most. In
view of the natural parents' predominant
right to the custody of their child and the
long-range benefit that the State feels is
rendered to the child by such foster plans,
it is felt that the Court decided wisely in
sustaining the petition.
Legal Control of Church Property
The historical development of the con-
trol of church property in Pennsylvania was
highlighted by the recent case of St. Peter's
R. C. Parish v. Urban Redevelopment Au-
thority, decided in that state's Supreme
Court.' St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church
in Pittsburgh was part of a ninety-acre
blighted area condemned by the Urban Re-
development Authority. The Authority had
exempted from the redevelopment project
another church within the blighted area.
Later, the Bishop of the Diocese of Pitts-
burgh, as trustee of the property of St.
Peter's congregation, agreed with the Au-
thority to accept 11 million dollars in
settlement of the taking and destruction of
the parish property. Some parishioners of
St. Peter's then brought this suit in equity
against the Authority for abuse of its dis-
cretion. The Court held that, since a statute
gave to the Bishop-trustee alone the power
to dispose of the church property, plaintiff-
beneficiaries had no standing to sue, absent
allegations that the trustee had exercised his
powers either in bad faith or in contraven-
tion of the canon law constituting the terms
of the trust.
The statute which was dispositive of the
1394 Pa. 194, 146 A.2d 724 (1958).
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case does not reflect the traditional Pennsyl-
vania law on the control of church property.
Prior to its enactment in 1935,2 this Bishop
would have been powerless to transfer par-
ish property to the condemning municipal
body, for the previous statute, passed in
1855, placed the control and disposition of
any property held by any person in trust
for a religious group solely in the hands of
the lay members of that religious group.8
The courts construed this statute as vesting
absolute ownership in the congregation and
making the named trustee but a passive,
silent depository of legal title, who held
without interest and without power.4 The
rule that the trustee of title had no interest
in the property led to such interesting hold-
ings as that a lay group might compel the
Bishop-trustee to transfer his title to any-
one of their choosing,5 and that notice of a
municipal claim against parish property
was not proper statutory notice when given
to the Bishop who was trustee of the title to
the property. 6
Exactly what rules were to govern the
lay members of the congregation in their
control of its property was dubious; at least
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 81 (1939).
3 See Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 Atl.
740 (1908). "Act April 26, 1855 (P.L. 330), § 7,
provides that 'whensoever any property . . . shall
hereafter be bequeathed, devised or conveyed to
any ecclesiastical ... or other person, for the use
of any church, congregation, or religious society
for religious worship or sepulture, or the main-
tenance of either, the same shall not be otherwise
taken and held, or inure, than subject to the con-
trol and disposition of the lay members of such
church, congregation, or religious society, or such
constituted officers or representatives thereof .......
70 AtI. at 745.
4 See Carrick Borough v. Canevin, 243 Pa. 283,
90 Atl. 147 (1914); Krauczunas v. Hoban, supra
note 3.
5 Krauczunas v. Hoban, supra note 3.
one case indicated that the property of a
Roman Catholic congregation must be held
as the Church canons require,' while an-
other case indicated that only the uses and
trusts to which the property had lawfully
been dedicated determined the lay trustees'
control. s An amendment in 1913 cleared up
this difficulty by subjecting the control of
lay members "to the rules and regulations,
usages, canons, discipline and requirements
of the religious body or congregation to
which such church, congregation, or reli-
gious society shall belong."9 This act was
construed as limiting the laity's control only
by those rules of the church which did not
nullify the essential lay control demanded
by the statute. 10 Thus, where a by-law of
the congregation required the Bishop's sanc-
tion for the disposition of the congregation's
property, it was held that the by-law was in
contravention of the statute and not civilly
lawful. 1
I However, if the heart of the dispute be-
tween laity and clergy was of an ecclesiasti-
cal nature, even though the result affected
the congregation's property, the courts did
not upset the ruling of the proper church
authorities.' 2 A common example of an ec-
4 Carrick Borough v. Canevin, supra note 4.
7 Dochkus v. Lithuanian Ben. Soc'y of St. An-
thony, 206 Pa. 25, 55 Atl. 779 (1903).
8 Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 AtI. 740
(1908). In this parishioners' action to compel a
Roman Catholic Bishop to convey his title to
parish property to a person chosen by the lay
trustees, it was considered no defense to the Bishop
that he was the proper owner of the property
according to Church canon.
9 See Maceirinas v. Chesna, 229 Pa. 70, 149 At.
94, 95 (1930).
10 Ibid.
11 In re St. Mary's Immaculate Conception Greek
Catholic Church, 296 Pa. 307, 145 AtI. 862
(1929).
12 See In re Trustees of St. Casimir's Polish R. C.
Church, 273 Pa. 494, 117 Atl. 219 (1922).
clesiastical determination with reverbera-
tions in the property area is the dissolution
of a parish or the transfer of certain parish-
ioners from one parish to another. Thus,
when the elected representatives of certain
parishioners who were transferred from one
parish to another sued to have title trans-
ferred from the Bishop to them, the court
denied what would otherwise have been
their right to choose the trustee of title on
the ground that disassocation from the
parish severed their rights in the parish
property.' 3 The court explained that while
membership in the congregation gave prop-
erty rights, it was not a property right in
itself, and was a matter of sole ecclesiastical
jurisdiction.
The present statute,1 4 passed in 1935,
wrought a radical change in the state's ap-
proach to church property. 15 Property con-
trol is no longer in lay members but in those
persons to whom the rules of the religion
would give control. As under the previous
statute, the persons having control are to
exercise it according to the internal laws of
the religious society.
13 In re Trustees of St. Casimir's Polish R. C.
Church, supra note 12.
14 "Whensoever any property ... has ... or shall
hereafter be bequeathed, devised, or conveyed to
any ecclesiastical corporation, bishop . . . for the
use of any church ... for or in trust for religious
worship .... the same shall be taken and held sub-
ject to the control and disposition of such officers
or authorities of such church . . . having a con-
trolling power according to the rules . . . of such
church . . . , which control and disposition shall
be exercised in accordance with and subject to the
rules and regulations ... of the religious body . ..
to which such church . . . shall belong .... " PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 81 (1939).
15 See Post v. Dougherty, 326 Pa. 97, 191 Atl. 151
(1937); Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Her-
mits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 Atl. 140
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The trust principle invoked by the Court
in the principal case is the well-established
one that it is for the trustees and not the
beneficiaries to sue a third party acting ad-
versely to the trust. 16 The Court states that
the plaintiffs could have availed themselves
of exceptions to this principle, had they
alleged on the part of their Bishop-trustee
either contravention of the canon law or
bad faith.
The circumstances surrounding the trans-
fer of the church building are treated cur-
sorily in the opinion, and there are no
allegations involving canon law. It is thus
left to conjecture which canons the plain-
tiffs might have brought into issue. It
seems probable that the canons regulating
the administration 7 and alienation 18 of
church property would bear on the Bishop's
act in accepting damages for the condemned
church. The objection might be raised that
the transfer was not an alienation within
the meaning of canon law, on the reasoning
that the alienation canons are part of the
Title "On Contracts" in the Code of Canon
Law,1 9 that all acts regulated by that Title
(1937). The Canovaro case held the act of 1935
constitutional, even though it acted retroactively
to deprive the lay members of religious congre-
gations of their existing control over the congre-
gation's property. The court held that the right of
control was not a vested interest, in that it was
a control not only severely limited by the laws of
the church but also one lacking the usual discre-
tionary power had by a trustee over the res.
16 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 282, at 2144 (2d ed. 1956).
1 7 CODEX LURIS CANONICI, Cans. 1518-28. On all
references to the canons, see generally BOUSCAREN
& ELLIS, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY
797-845 (2d rev. ed. 1951). On the question of the
alienation canons, see generally HESTON, THE
ALIENATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY (Catholic Uni-
versity of America Canon Law Studies No. 132,
1941).
18 Cans. 1529-43.
19 Title 29 of Book 3, containing canons 1529
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are contractual in the canonical sense, which
imports consent, 20 while submission to a
condemnation order is not a consensual act.
However, it appears that, in the act of sub-
mission, consent may be found negatively
in either of two ways: first, by the relinquish-
ment of the pre-eminence that the Church
considers she has over the civil power in the
disposition of her property; 2' and second,
by the failure to civilly appeal the order of
the condemning authority. If, then, the
alienation canons are applicable, in this
transfer of property of permanent value it
was incumbent upon the Bishop to receive
a written appraisal of its value from trust-
worthy experts, to have a just cause for such
an alienation of church property, and to re-
ceive the permission of his legitimate su-
perior, 22 here the Holy See.2'3 Although not
helping the plaintiffs here to prove an invalid
alienation, the fact is yet of interest that the
proceeds of an alienation must be invested
carefully, safely, and usefully for the benefit
of the parish which owned the property, 24
unless the assets of that parish are canoni-
cally transferred to a new parish 25 or other
through 1543, is entitled "De Contractibus."
20 See Cahill, What Law Governs Church Con-
tracts?, Catholic Building and Maintenance, Nov.-
Dec. 1958, p. 7.
21 See Can. 1495, § 1. See generally Cahill, supra
note 20.
22 Can. 1530, § 1, nn.1, 2, 3.
23 Can. 1532, § 1, n.2 provides that where prop-
erty is worth more than 30,000 lire or francs, the
legitimate superior is the Holy See. The equiva-
lent amount in the United States is $10,000. See
BOUSCAREN & ELLIS, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 834-35 (2d rev. ed. 1951).
2 4 Can. 1531, § 3.
25 Can. 1500 provides that upon division of a
parish, either by a union of part of it with an-
other parish or by the establishment of a part of
it as a new parish, the property which has been
intended for the benefit of the whole shall be
ecclesiastical entity. 26
The canons on the administration of
church property might also afford plaintiffs
a ground for challenging the action of their
Bishop-trustee. Since all church property
is owned not by individual persons but by
moral persons, 27 i.e., dioceses, parishes, 28
it is necessary that there be administrators
to assume responsibility for the manage-
ment of the property. 29 While the local
Ordinary is to watch over the administratibn
of the property within his jurisdiction,30
he is the immediate administrator only of
what might be called strictly diocesan prop-
erty.3' He may not take on himself the
immediate administration of property which
by law has its o~vn administrator, 32 and a
reading of canons 1182 and 1183 together
indicates that the pastor is the administrator
of such parish property as would include
the church building. Thus, had the Bishop-
trustee transferred the property without the
consent of its immediate pastor-adminis-
trator, the plaintiffs again might have
divided rightly.
20 Can. 1501 provides that when a parish no
longer exists, its property passes to the immedi-
ately superior body.
27 Can. 1495, § 2.
28 Cans. 99; 100.
29 Administration is the preservation and im-
provement of property held, the production of
income from such property, and the application
of that income to the proper persons. BOUSCAREN
& ELLIS, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY
822 (2d rev. ed. 1951).
30 Can. 1519, § 1.
31 See Cans. 1357; 1359, § 1; 1182, § 1; 1483.
32 Can. 1519, § 2 provides that the Bishop, in reg-
ulating the administration of property, must take
into account legitimate customs. In the present
organization of the Church, each moral person
enjoys financial autonomy and the administration
of its own property. See BOUSCAREN & ELLIS,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 823.
brought themselves within the exception to
the rule that the beneficiaries of a trust hay a
no standing to sue a third party.
Failing to allege a contravention of canon
law, a few examples of which were suggested
above, or bad faith, which plaintiffs took
pains to deny expressly, the plaintiffs as
beneficiaries of the property held by the
Bishop as trustee did not have standing be-
fore the Court. As pointed out by Justice
Musmanno in his concurring opinion, it
was indeed unfortunate that they were
thus unable to save that "ecclesiastical
monument of rare and priceless beauty."13 3
Religious Control of Commercial
Television
Foreign control of American Catholic
religious orders is not often the subject
of judicial inquiry by our courts. In the
recent case of Noe v. FCC," such a prob-
lem was placed in issue when a Catholic
non-profit, non-stock educational corpora-
tion run by the Jesuit order applied for a
license to operate a commercial television
station. Objection was made, based on the
connection of the corporation with the
international order of the Society of Jesus,
the present superior of which is a Belgian
citizen residing in Rome. The incorporated
university was claimed ineligible to hold a
license under the Federal Communications
Act as a "representative" of an "alien ' 2
and as a corporation whose stock was
3a St. Peter's R. C. Parish v. Urban Redevelop-
ment Authority, 394 Pa. 194, 146 A.2d 724, 728
(1958).
1 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
March 2, 1959.
248 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)
(1952).
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"voted" by "representatives" of aliens. 3
All its directors were American citizens.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
decided that the statutory provision is
concerned primarily with preventing alien
activities during time of war, that the chain
of authority in the Jesuit order is merely
ecclesiastical, and that the only indications
of alien control were a limited power to
appoint and promote officials within the
religious community and not officers and
directors of the corporation.
Religious ownership of commercial
broadcasting stations is not unusual in
this country, 4 although Catholic religious
are precluded by canon law from engaging
in any profit-seeking, strictly industrial
business ownership.5 Generally, it would
seem that the only proper subjects of in-
quiry upon an individual's application for a
license are citizenship, character, and finan-
cial and technical qualifications.0 A li-
3 Ibid.
4 See, e.g., Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d
244 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Evangelical Lutheran
.Synod v. FCC, 105 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850
(D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1933).
5 BOUSCAREN & ELLIS, COMMENTARY ON CANON
LAW 119 (2d ed. 1951). A recent Papal encycli-
cal, however, concerning motion pictures, radio
and television, calls for increasing and making
more effective Catholic religious programs
through the use of these means of communica-
•tion. Encyclical Letter of Pius Xll, Miranda
Prorsus, reprinted in The Pope Speaks, pp. 319,
340 (Winter 1957-58).
6 47 C.F.R. § 3.24 (1958). This rule is the codi-
fication of various judicial decisions. See FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940);
Mester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118
(E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 332 U.S. 749 (1947). Other
requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations
do not seem to affect an individual's personal
qualifications for a license.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
censed broadcaster, while not divested of
his constitutional right of free speech,
has been characterized as a " 'trustee' for
the public"'7 whose business is "impressed
with a public interest." As such, broad-
casting is one of the few areas where licen-
sing of speech is permitted. However, the
Federal Communications Commission, as
licensor, is expressly prohibited from im-
posing any censorship of station program-
ming."
The right to determine, select and super-
vise programs is inherent to the holding of
a station license. 10 This power may not
lawfully be delegated." The regulations
promulgated by the FCC clearly indicate
that any outside "control" 12 over a licensee
is illicit.' 3 During the course of the years,
the courts have implemented this aversion
to undue influence on the part of unlicensed
7 See McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co.,
151 F.2d 597, 599 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 779 (1946).
8 See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47
F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
9 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1952).
10 Regents of New Mexico College v. Albuquer-
que Broadcasting Co., 158 F.2d 900, 905 (10th
Cir. 1947).
11 Ibid.
12 The Federal Communications Act defines "con-
trol" in more than one place. "The word 'control'
as used herein is not limited to majority stock
ownership, but includes actual working control
in whatever manner exercised." 47 C.F.R. § 3.35
n.1 (1958). See also 47 C.F.R. § 3.636 n.1 (1958).
Regulations and rules promulgated by the Com-
mission, pursuant to its statutory authority, have
the force and effect of law. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418
(1942).
1347 C.F.R. § 3.131 (1958) (banning exclusive
affiliation of a 'station to any one network); 47
C.F.R. § 3.133 (1958) (limits term of network
affiliation to two years); 47 C.F.R. § 3.135 (1958)
(forbids networks from rejecting or compelling
the broadcast of any program).
parties. Considered a pertinent factor is
local ownership of the prospective licensee,
since this is deemed a fair assurance that
he will operate in the public interest.'4 Sim-
ilarly, newcomers into the field are preferred
over existing licensees. This policy has been
labelled the "diversification of control" doc-
trine' 5 and is aimed at preventing public
dependence on any single person or group
for commercial radio or television com-
munications. For purposes of ownership
and control, even persons outside the busi-
ness organization 'may be considered prin-
cipals. Thus, in WLOX v. FCC,' 6 a major
creditor of a corporation applying for a
TV license was deemed subject to investi-
gation as to his own qualifications for a
license.
The most important determinative factor
which the FCC considers in granting or
renewing a broadcasting license is the pub-
lic interest, convenience or necessity. 1'7
An important element of public interest and
convenience affecting the issue of a license
is the ability of the licensee to render the
best practicable service to the community
reached by his broadcasts.' 8
Thus, a broadcaster who constantly pro-
jects his own personal business interests in
the operation of his station, even though
much of the programming is entertaining
and unobjectionable, is operating contrary
to the public interest.' 9 A licensee will
14 See Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230
F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956).
15 McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239
F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
918 (1957).
16 260 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
17 47 U.S.C. 307(a) (1952).
18 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 475 (1940).
19 See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d
violate the "public interest" if he agrees to
accept programs on any basis other than
his own reasonable decision that the pro-
grams are satisfactory. 20 However, the fact
that a new station will provide some eco-
nomic injury to existing stations does not
so conflict with the public interest as to
preclude additional licensing. 2
1
Also embraced within the public interest
doctrine is the likelihood that a station
owner will give a "fair break" in his pro-
-gramming to those who do not share his
own views. 22 Counterbalanced against this
public responsibility of fairness is the right
of a broadcaster, clothed as he is with the
protection of the first amendment and op-
erating pursuant to a nondelegable steward-
ship over a public medium of communica-
tions, to determine his own programming.
The Third Circuit, in Mclntire v. Wm. Penn
Broadcasting Co.,23 faced with this dicho-
tomy of interest, decided that a radio sta-
tion which had made it a practice to devote
one-fifth of its available broadcasting time
to paid religious programs could legitimately
cancel all executory contracts for such
programs. The court agreed with the FCC's
determination that the choice of programs
rzsts exclusively with the licensee 24 and
upheld the new policy of the station to run
a series of religious broadcasts of general
670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
20 Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hil-
dreth & Rogers Co., 87 F. Supp. 822 (D.C.
Mass. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
21 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
22 See WNBX Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 837,
841 (1948).
23 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 779 (1946).
24 Id. at 599.
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interest on sustaining time. 25 Of course, a
station owner would not be allowed to
adopt a policy of vilifying a particular re-
ligious institution over the air waves. 26
Noe v. FCC, 27 apparently the first case
decided under the "alien provision" of the
Federal Communications Act, indicates that
owhership of communication media by
American Catholic ecclesiastics does not
conflict with the high degree of autonomy
required by the law. A judicial deaf ear was
turned to the plea that the educational
corporation was a mere "instrumentality of
the Holy Roman Pontificate." The court
buttressed its opinion by pointing to the
"fair break" tendencies already exhibited
by the university in allowing local Protes-
tant clergymen to utilize a university-run
radio station for religious Sunday morning
programs. Further, a distinction was made
between ownership by the leaders of a relig-
ious community and by men of business.
In this regard, the court expressly left
undecided whether persons with similar
powers of appointment and authority over
applicants in a business organization would
be considered principals for purposes of
ownership.
This case is in accord with the unified
thread of judicial. decision proclaiming that
the entire purpose of the Federal Com-
munications Act is to protect the public
interest and to keep broadcasting media in
the control of U.S. citizens. These princi-
ples do not seem incompatible with station
ownership by an American affiliate of an in-
25 Sustaining time refers to a program which is
transmitted without a sponsor.
26 See Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
599 (1933).
2T 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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ternational non-business organization. It is
suggested that the non-business distinction
applied in the Noe case can be extended to
areas other than the religious. For example,
even a secular organization such as the
American Association for the United Na-
tions28 should not be denied a broadcasting
license merely because of its inextricable
connection to the international organiza-
tion.
Further, it should be noted that the "fair
break" doctrine does not constitute an abso-
lute gauge to guide station programming.
28 The AAUN, located at 345 E. 46th St., New
York, N.Y., is an organization dedicated to
building a strong public opinion in support of the
United Nations.
The tenor of the Mclntire29 opinion strongly
indicates that a broadcaster has consider-
able leeway in his determination of the
character and type of programs transmitted.
However, where a station is dependent
upon commercial sponsorship for its broad-
casting, the owner is peculiarly attuned to
the attitude of the community.30 This prac-
tical consideration alone would militate
against most programs offensive to a vocal
minority. Thus, the commercial necessi-
ties of the situation dictate that programs
in the public interest must interest the
listening public.
29 Mclntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151
F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
779 (1946).
30 For an interesting article concerning this prob-
lem of commercial broadcasting see N. Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1958, § 6 (Magazine), p. 26.
